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THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT RECOGNIZES AN IMPLIED
RIGHT OF CONTRIBUTION FOR DEFENDANTS IN RULE 10b-5
ACTIONS IN MUSICK, PEELER & GARRETT v. EMPLOYERS
INSURANCE OF WAUSAU: A JUDICIAL OAK GROWS FROM THE
SAND
I. INTRODUCTION
"When we deal with private actions under Rule 10b-5, we deal with a
judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn."'
When Justice William Rehnquist penned these words in 1974, he could
not have known how large the oak tree would grow or how often his anal-
ogy would be quoted. At that time, the United States Supreme Court rec-
ognized that the judiciary would be primarily responsible for defining the
branches and shape of Rule 10b-5, even though Congress had never pro-
vided explicit authority for the courts to do so.2 For instance, the federal
courts have interpreted Rule 10b-5 to imply certain rights and causes of
action. 3
Defining the precise extent of the federal courts' power to continue
to imply rights through Rule 10b-5 has created considerable controversy.
4
1. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975) (reaf-
firming that, in context of alleged securities fraud violations under § 10(b) of Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 of Securities and Exchange
Commission, only purchasers and sellers of securities may maintain private cause
of action under Rule lOb-5).
2. Id. at 730-37 (discussing history of judicial actions under Rule 101>5 and
concluding that Supreme Court must "flesh out" Rule 101>5 because "neither the
congressional enactment nor the administrative regulations offer conclusive gui-
dance" for interpreting Rule 10b-5).
3. For a full discussion of implied causes of action generally and the develop-
ment of the Rule 101>5 implied cause of action in particular, see infra notes 44-95
and accompanying text.
4. For a discussion of the controversy surrounding implied rights under Rule
101>5, see infra notes 65-95 and accompanying text. The debate over the shaping
of Rule 101-5 actions revolves around divergent views regarding the extent to
which federal courts should exercise powers that are essentially legislative in na-
ture. See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773,
2783 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that "[r]aising up causes of action
where a statute has not created them" is improper action for federal courts). In
Lampf, the Supreme Court established a statute of limitations for actions brought
under Rule 101>5. Id. at 2776-82. This case brought the controversy surrounding
the shaping of Rule 10b-5 into public focus, causing Congress to react by amend-
ing the Securities Act of 1934 to limit the scope of the Lampf decision. See Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 § 27A, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-1 (Supp. IV 1992) (limiting
retroactivity of Lampf ruling). Some courts have rejected the congressional re-
sponse to Lampf, characterizing the amendment as an unconstitutional violation of
separation of powers principles. See, e.g., Treiber v. Katz, 796 F. Supp. 1054, 1059
(E.D. Mich. 1992) (holding § 27A unconstitutional because it "purports to reopen
(165)
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For example, while several courts have extended contribution rights to
defendants in Rule lOb-5 cases, 5 other courts have questioned whether the
judiciary should continue to expand implied rights without legislative sup-
port. 6 One court opposing judicial expansion of implied contribution
cases in which courts have rendered final judgments"); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm,
Inc., 789 F. Supp. 231, 235 (E.D. Ky. 1992) (stating that "§ 27A(b) is an unconstitu-
tional exercise of legislative power, and cannot be permitted to interfere with de-
fendants' final judgment and their vested rights therein"), aff'd, 1 F.3d 1487 (6th
Cir. 1993). But see, e.g., Brown v. Hutton Group, 795 F. Supp. 1307, 1313-14
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (upholding constitutionality of § 27A because statute does not pre-
scribe decisions of judicial branch without changing underlying law); Venturtech
II v. Deloitte Haskins & Sells, 790 F. Supp. 576, 579 (E.D.N.C. 1992) (dismissing
plaintiff's securities claim in 1991 pursuant to Lampf decision and, in conformity
with § 27A, reinstating claim in 1992), aff'd without op. sub nom. Heritage Capital
Corp. v. Deloitte Haskins & Sells, 933 F.2d 228 (4th Cir. 1993). For a comprehen-
sive list of cases addressing the constitutionality of § 27A, see Treiber, 796 F. Supp.
at 1057 n.4. For a thorough discussion of the constitutionality of § 27A, see Craig
W. Palm, The Constitutionality of Section 27A of the Securities Exchange Act: Is Congress
Rubbing Lampf the Wrong Way?, 37 VILL. L. REv. 1213, 1325-28 (1992).
5. See, e.g., In reJiffy Lube Sec. Litig., 927 F.2d 155, 160 (4th Cir. 1991) ("[I]t is
well established that there is a right to contribution for parties jointly liable for
violating Section 10(b) and Rule lob-5." (citing In re Atlantic Fin. Management,
Inc. Sec. Litig., 718 F. Supp. 1012, 1015 (D. Mass. 1988))); Franklin v. Kaypro
Corp., 884 F.2d 1222, 1226 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that "contribution exists under
claims based on section 10(b) ...and Rule 10b-5"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 890
(1990); Sirota v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 673 F.2d 566, 578 (2d Cir.) ("[T]his circuit
... permit[s] contribution in section 10(b) cases even though section 10 of the
Securities Exchange Act, unlike sections 9 and 18, does not expressly provide
therefore."), cert. denied 459 U.S. 838 (1982); Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean,
640 F.2d 534, 556-59 (5th Cir. 1981) (detailing arguments for and against contri-
bution in Rule lob-5 actions and concluding that contribution in Rule lOb-5 ac-
tions provides "equitable result"), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 459
U.S. 375 (1983); Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330, 334 (7th Cir. 1979) (conclud-
ing that "contribution is available in a Rule lOb-5 situation"). For a complete dis-
cussion of cases recognizing contribution under § 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission
Rules, see infra notes 69-83 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., Chutich v. Touche Ross & Co., 960 F.2d 721, 724 (8th Cir. 1992)
(holding that there is "no Congressional authorization for the judicial creation of
a federal common law... power to create a right of action for contribution among
violators of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5"); Robin v. Doctors Officenters Corp.,
730 F. Supp. 122, 125 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (finding that "[n]either the legislative history
nor the language of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 supports an implied right of
contribution"); In re Professional Fin. Management, Ltd., 683 F. Supp. 1283, 1286
(D. Minn. 1988) ("The court.., finds that no implied right to contribution exists
under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule lOb-5."); see also King v. Gibbs, 876
F.2d 1275, 1280-81 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating in dicta that contribution rights should
not be recognized under § 10(b)); In re Olympia Brewing Co. Sec. Litig., 674 F.
Supp. 597, 614 (N.D. Il. 1987) (arguing that contribution should not be granted
in Rule 1 Ob-5 actions because of questionable reasoning of precedent, but holding
that contribution allowed under § 10(b) because bound by precedent). For a
complete discussion of cases refusing to recognize contribution rights under
§ 10(b) and Rule Ob-5, see infra notes 84-95 and accompanying text.
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rights under Rule 10b-5 has maintained that precedent supporting im-
plied contribution rights is "built on a foundation of sand."
7
Nineteen years after Justice Rehnquist made his judicial oak analogy,
his words were invoked again during the oral argument of Musick, Peeler &
Garrett v. Employers Insurance of Wausau.8 Musick began as a class action suit
brought by the shareholders of Cousins Corporation, a California corpora-
tion alleging, along with other charges, fraudulent activity in violation of
section 10(b) of the Securities.Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act). 9 The
corporation settled with the shareholders out of court and Employers In-
surance of Wausau (Wausau), which provided indemnity insurance to all
but two of the defendants, paid a $13.5 million settlement. 10 Subrogated
to the rights of the insureds, Wausau sought contribution from the corpo-
ration's lawyers and accountants who were involved in the public offer-
ing." The United States Supreme Court ultimately granted certiorari on
the issue of whether an implied right to contribution exists under Rule
10b-5.12 The Supreme Court resolved a split among the circuits and ad-
ded another branch to the 'judicial oak" by holding that defendants in a
7. Olympia Brewing, 674 F. Supp. at 614.
8. See Oral Argument for Petitioners, Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers
Ins. of Wausau, 113 S. Ct. 2085 (1993), reprintedin 17 RICO L. REP. 523, 529 (Mar.
1993). During oral argument, one Justice, responding to an argument by counsel
for petitioners that implied contribution rights are not yet a "judicial oak," stated
that contribution rights in Rule lOb-5 cases are "certainly more than an acorn, and
there are a lot of cases out there, and there have been for a good many years." Id.
Counsel for petitioners finally conceded, "Well, perhaps it's a little sapling ... 
Id.
9. Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 113 S. Ct. 2085,
2086-87 (1993). The shareholders charged Cousins, the holding company of
Cousins, several officers and directors of Cousins and two lead underwriters with
"the omission of material facts in connection with the sale of stock during a De-
cember 1983 public offering." Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Musick, Peeler & Gar-
rett, [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 95,208 (Apr. 9, 1990), rev'd,
954 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1992), aff'd, 113 S. Ct. 2085 (1993). For a full discussion of
the facts and procedural history of the Musick decision, see infra notes 96-107 and
accompanying text.
10. Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2086.
11. Id. For a complete record of the claims and parties involved in the origi-
nal contribution and indemnification action brought by Wausau, see Employers Ins.,
[1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 95,208.
12. Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2086 (deciding on sole issue of "[w]hether federal
courts may imply a private right to contribution in Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion"). Contribution rights in Rule l0b-5 actions were already firmly established in
the Ninth Circuit at the time of that court's 1992 decision in Employers Insurance.
See Smith v. Mulvaney, 827 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1987) ("We hold that an implied
right of contribution exists under Section 10(b) and Rule lob-5."). Thus, little
attention was given to the issue of whether contribution among defendants accom-
panies liability in Rule 10b-5 actions. See Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Musick,
Peeler & Garrett, 954 F.2d 575, 577 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that "[w]e have recog-
nized ... that [§ 10(b) and Rule 101>5] imply a right of contribution"), affid, 113 S.
Ct. 2085 (1993).
3
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Rule 10b-5 action have a right to seek contribution from other
wrongdoers.S
The Musick decision is one of a series of cases through which the
Supreme Court has refined and shaped the branches of the Rule 10b-5
action over the past twenty years.1 4 Over the past few years, however, cer-
tain members of Congress and some interest groups have become increas-
ingly unhappy with the Rule lOb-5 action. 15 The discontent of Congress
and interest groups stems from the expanding number of meritless cases
filed in hope of settlement, and the prevalence of skyrocketing' damage
awards that, although lucrative for attorneys, severely threaten some pro-
fessions.1 6 Congress' failure to address these problems has made it neces-
13. Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2092.
14. See, e.g., Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct.
2773 (1991) (establishing statute of limitations for Rule 101-5 actions); Randall v.
Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647 (1986) (defining remedies and measures of damages
available under Rule 10b-5); Herman & MacLean v., Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375
(1983) (setting forth standard of proof required for investor to establish cause of
action under Rule 10b-5); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (de-
lineating standard of conduct investor must show to establish cause of action
under Rule 10b-5); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975)
(defining persons entitled to bring Rule 10b-5 action). The Supreme Court has
also held that no action for aiding and abetting exists under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5. Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 114 S. Ct.
1439, 1455 (1994). For further discussion of Central Bank, see infra notes 178-81
and accompanying text.
15. See Private Litigation Under the Federal Securities Laws: Hearings Before the Sub-
committee on Securities of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (hereinafter Hearings] (compiling testimony of Sena-
tors, Congresspersons, corporate executives, attorneys, accountants and academics
addressing private securities litigation crisis and hotly debating reform issues).
The President of the United Shareholders Association, Ralph V. Whitworth, ar-
gued that attorneys and "professional plaintiffs," not shareholders, are the true
beneficiaries of Rule 10b-5. Id. at 304. However, William R. McLucas, Director of
the Division of Enforcement of the SEC, testified that "private actions will continue
to be essential to the maintenance of investoi protection," and that "the implied
private right of action under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 thereunder is critically
important to the effective operation of the Federal securities laws." Id. at 113.
16. See id. at 299-305. Jake L. Netterville, the Chairman of the Board for the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, testified that "[t]he evidence is
unmistakable. The securities laws are working exactly contrary to the principles of
investor protection and civiljustice. The problem cries out for reform." Id. at 302.
The Chairman of the Public Oversight Board of the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants, A.A. Sommer, Jr., testified on behalf of accountants that secur-
ities litigation settlements may "ruin" many major firms and that reform is needed.
Id.; see also 138 CONG. REc. S12,599 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1992) (Sen. Domenici (R-
NM) arguing that excessive and frivolous litigation "has reached epidemic dimen-
sions in the court-created private actions brought under section 10(b)"); 138
CONG. REc. E2463 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1992) (Rep. Tauzin (D-LA) explaining how
Rule 101-5 actions are used by speculators and "'unscrupulous" attorneys to recoup
losses from risky investments, through settlements without regard to merits of
case).
4
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sary for the Supreme Court to repeatedly step in, as it did in Musick, to
limit and define the Rule 10b-5 action. 17
This Note explores the background of implied private causes of ac-
tion under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule
10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 1 8 This Note
then examines two 1981 Supreme Court cases involving implied contribu-
tion rights, which set the foundation for and influenced the Supreme
Court's decision in Musick1 9 This Note also examines the rationales of the
lower courts in both granting and denying implied rights to contribution
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.20 After presenting the relevant back-
ground, this Note sets forth the facts and procedural history of the Musick
case 21 and then analyzes the reasoning of both the Musick majority and
dissent.22 While agreeing with the outcome of the Musick decision, this
Note asserts that the basis of Justice Kennedy's majority opinion rests on
questionable reasoning.25 Further, this Note suggests that the effects of
this decision will necessitate future judicial restriction of implied causes of
action and also compel congressional.reform of Rule 10b-5.24 Finally, this
Note concludes by suggesting that the Musick decision raises separation of
powers issues and may open the door for indemnification rights for de-
fendants in Rule 10b-5 actions.
17. For a discussion of various Supreme Court cases defining the scope of
Rule 10b-5, see supra note 14. Although Congress has remained silent thus far,
legislation addressing Rule lOb-5 reform is currently gaining support in the House
of Representatives and in the Senate. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 1994, S. 1976, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (Senate bill); Securities Private En-
forcement Reform Act, H.R. 417, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (House bill). For
further discussion of this legislation, see infra notes 183-85 and accompanying text.
18. For a complete discussion, of implied causes of action under § 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5, see infra notes 25-52 and accompanying text.
19., For a discussion of Supreme Court cases which influenced the Musick
Court, see supra note 14 and infra notes 53-64 and accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of the rationales of the various.lower courts in both deny-
ing.and granting implied rights to contribution under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, see
infra notes 65-95 and accompanying text.
21. For a discussion of the facts and procedural history of the Musick case, see
infra notes 96-107 and accompanying text.
22. For a full discussion of the reasoning of the Musick Court, see infra notes
108-45 and accompanying text.
23. For a critical analysis of the Musick case, see infra notes 146-67 and accom-
panying text.
24. For a discussion of the impact of the Musick case, see infra notes 168-87
and accompanying text.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Birth of Rule lOb-5 and the Implied Private Cause of Action: The"
Acorn Takes Root
Securities fraud and rampant speculation in the stock market precipi-
tated "Black October" and the devastating crash of 1929.25 The ensuing
national economic crisis made a congressional response necessary.2 6 Con-
gress sought to assure the country, through comprehensive legislation,
that the events leading up to the crash would not be repeated.2 7 Conse-
quently, Congress passed the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to control
excessive speculation on securities and to curtail manipulation of security
prices.2 8 Specifically, section 10(b) of the 1934 Act was created to protect
against fraud in the sale and purchase of securities. 29
In 1942, the Securities and Exchange Commission created Rule 10b-5
to provide additional protection to investors by expanding the application
of section 10(b).30 Rule 10b-5 broadened the scope of existing legislation
25. Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act, 42 STrAN. L. REv. 385, 407-13 (1990) (citing, among others, Franklin D.
Roosevelt: "The people of this country are.., fully aware of the fact that unregu-
lated speculation in securities and in commodities was one of the most important
contributing factors in the artificial and unwarranted 'boom' which had so much
to do with the terrible conditions of the years following 1929.").
26. Id. at 408-09 (stating that "[c] onventional wisdom holds that the Exchange
Act was passed in response to the 1929 crash").
27. Id. at 424-42 (outlining and analyzing the legislative history of the 1934
Act; see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194-201 (1976) (reviewing his-
tory of § 10(b) and Rule IOb-5, stating that "[f] ederal regulation of transactions in
securities emerged as part of the aftermath of the market crash in 1929").
28. Thel, supra note 25, at 424-60 (detailing legislative history of 1934 Act and
arguing that major goal of 1934 Act was to stop speculation and manipulation of
security values).
29. Id. Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails,
or of any facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security
not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may pre-
scribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protec-
tion of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
30. Rule lob-5 of the SEC provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails
or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not mis-
leading, or
[Vol. 39: p. 165
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NOTE
by extending the 1934 Act, which applied only to brokers and dealers, to
protect all individuals and corporations transacting in securities. 3 1
Although section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 set out prohibitions against
fraud and deceit in securities transactions, neither provision provided for
a private right of action as an enforcement mechanism.3 2 The SEC has
limited power to enforce the securities laws, but it has no power to force
violators to compensate injured victims. 33 Individuals who are injured
under the securities laws can bring a private suit to recover damages if the
provision violated explicitly creates a cause of action,34 or if the provision
violated does not explicitly provide for a private suit, courts may imply the
right.35 In 1946, courts began to imply a private cause of action in Rule
10b-5 to further protect investors and to provide a means for them to re-
cover damages from section 10(b) violations. 36
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which oper-
ates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (1993).
31. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 212-13 n.32 (noting that Rule lOb-5 "closes a
loophole in the protections against fraud administered by the Commission by
prohibiting individuals or companies from buying securities if they engage in
fraud in their purchase" (quoting SEC Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942))).
32. E.g., William H. Painter, Inside Information: Growing Pains for the Development
of Federal Corporation Law Under Rule 10b-5, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1361, 1366 (1965)
(stating that "[n]either [Rule 101>5] nor [§ 10(b)] expressly provides for a civil rem-
edy"). Section 10(b) only acts to forbid violation of SEC Rules. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j.
Also, Rule 10b-5 does not create a civil remedy. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.101>5. Seegener-
ally Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAw. 793 (1967)
(presenting papers and discussions concerning codification of federal securities
laws and including discussion of civil remedies under these laws). For the text of
§ 10(b), see supra note 29. For the text of Rule 10b-5, see supra note 30.
33. See William F. Schneider, Implying Private Rights and Remedies Under the Fed-
eral Securities Acts, 62 N.C. L. REv. 853, 859-63 (1984) (detailing statutory enforce-
ment powers of SEC and explaining various private action remedies for individuals
injured by violations of securities law).
34. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 9(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1988)
(providing for civil liability against any person who knowingly participates in price
manipulation in securities transaction); id. § 18(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1988) (pro-
viding for civil liability against any person who makes false or misleading statement
on document filed with SEC).
35. SeeJ.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430-31 (1964), (recognizing im-
plied right of action for breach of § 14(a) of 1934 Act).
36. See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
Kardon was the first court to imply a private cause of action under § 10(b) and Rule
10b-5, holding that "the mere omission of an express provision for civil liability is
not sufficient to negative what the general law implies." Id. In reaching this deci-
sion, the Kardon court relied on Texas & Pacific Railway v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33
(1916). Kardon, 69 F. Supp. at 513. Although Texas & Pacific Railway was subse-
quently overruled by Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), the case is generally consid-
ered to have laid the foundation for the doctrine of implied rights of action. See
Tamar Frankel, Implied Rights of Action, 67 VA. L. REv. 553, 559-84 (1981) (discuss-
ing historical trends in Supreme Court decisions dealing with implied rights of
action and comparing various policies underlying implied rights of action in secur-
ities cases).
1994]
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Twenty-five years after the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania first implied a private cause of action under sec-
tion 10(b) in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,3 7 the decision had received
such widespread support that the Supreme Court affirmed the right with-
out debate.3 8 Subsequently, although Congress has had ample opportu-
nity, it has refrained from any amendment or alteration of section 10(b),
thereby tacitly approving this judicially created remedy.3 9
While the Supreme Court has recognized the Rule 10b-5 private cause
of action, it has generally taken a restrictive view of implied causes of ac
tion.40 According to the Court, the existence of an implied right of action
is a question of both statutory construction and congressional ,intent.41 '
Thus, the Court has attempted to construct the Rule 10b-5 private action
within the contours of the other sections of the 1934 Act that permit a
private right of action, reasoning that this best accommodates congres-
37. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
38. 'Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9
(1971) (stating that "[i] t is now established that a private right of action is implied
under § 10(b)"); see Touche Ross &'Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 577-78 n.19
(1979) (stating that Court in Superintendent "simply explicitly acquiesced in the 25-
year-old acceptance of an implied action under § 10(b)"); see also Herman &
MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S: 375, 380 (1983) (unanimously recognizing that
"[t]he existence of this implied remedy is simply beyond peradventure")
39. See, e.g., Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4680 (1988) (making comprehensive changes in
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C. § 78), but'specifically not amending § 10(b)). Originally,
part of the 1988 Act was designed to expressly codify private actions under Rule
lOb-5, but this section was removed by amendment. See H.R. REP. No. 910, 100th,
Cong., 2d Sess. 25, 27 (1988) ("The [Energy and Commerce] Committee's inten-
tion in this amendment was to avoid creating an express. private cause of action
which might have the unintended effect of freezing the law or in any way restrict-
ing the potential rights of action which have been implied by the courts in this
area."); see also Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 386 ("Congress' decision to leave
§ 10(b) intact suggests that Congress ratified the cumulative nature of the § 10(b)
action.").
40. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) (declining to
recognize implied rights of action unless necessary to protect congressional in-
tent); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 749 (1974) (stating
that judicial extension of lOb-5 action must be limited until Congress addresses
issue); see also Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 111 S. Ct. 2749, 2763-64
(1991) (holding, in context of defining 'scope of implied private action undei
§ 14(a) of 1934 Act, that "the breadth of the [implied] right once recognized
should not ... grow beyond the scope congressionally intended," but, in face of
congressional silence, court can "look[ ] to policy reasons for deciding where the
outer limits of the right should lie").
41. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 717-18 .(1979)
("[F]ederal courts enforcing laws enacted by Congress ... must.., look to those
laws to determine whether there was an intent to create a private right of action
under them.") (Rehnquist, J., concurring); see also Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 571
("[I] mplying a private right of action on the basis of congressional silence is a haz-
ardous enterprise, at best.").
(Vol. 39: p. 165
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sional intent.42 Moreover, the Court has generally held that contribution
rights may be implied if clear congressional intent exists to provide for
these rights. 43
B. Contribution and the Supreme Court's View of Implied
Contribution Rights Generally
Courts generally recognize a right of contribution in cases where two
or, more .defendants are liable to the same plaintiff and one defendant has
paid more than its proportionate share of the damages.44 Although,
under common law, courts were reluctant to recognize a right to contribu-
tion,45 most states have since enacted legislation recognizing some form of
contribution between co-defendants. 46
Contribution has become increasingly important in today's world of
complex litigation where numerous defendants may each be liable for po-
42. See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct.
2773, 2780 (1991) (creating statute of limitations for Rule lOb-5 actions by analo-
gizing to similar provisions in Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and.stating that
"[w] hen the statute of origin contains comparable express remedial provisions, the
inquiry [into congressional intent] usually should be at an end").
43. See, e.g., Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639-40
(1981) (debating existence of implied right of contribution in e~pressed remedial
provision of Clayton Act, Court noted that its "focus, as it is in any case involving
the implication of a right of action, is on the intent of Congress"); Northwest
Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 91 (1981) (stating that
"[t]he ultimate question . . . is whether Congress intended to create the private
remedy-for example, a right to contributionmthat the plaintiff seeks to invoke").
For a more detailed discussion of Texas Industries and Northwest Airlines, see infra
notes 53-61 and accompanying text.
44. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A (1990) (stating that right of
contribution among tortfeasors is generally available when two or more persons
are tortiously liable to same person for same harm); James M. Fischer, Contribution
in lOb-5 Actions, 33 Bus. LAw. 1821, 1821-22 (1978) ("Contribution involves distrib-
uting losses among persons who arejointly and severally liable by requiring each to
pay a proportionate share ... usually related to fault ... or degree of participation
in the wrongful conduct.").
45. See Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 634 ("The common law provided no right to
contribution among joint tortfeasors." (citing Union Stock Yards Co. v. Chicago,
Burlington & Quincy Railroad, 196 U.S. 217, 227 (1905) and citing WILLLAM L.
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 50, 305-07 (4th ed. 1971))); Francis H. Bohlen, Contribu-
tion and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 21 CORNELL L.Q. 552, 552 (1936), (stating that
"[tJhe rule which, except modified by statute, is accepted in [almost) every com-
mon-law jurisdiction.. . . is that there can be no contribution between joint
tortfeasors," but arguing that contribution rights should exist).
46. See Brief for Respondents at 6 n.1, Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers
Ins. of Wausau, 113 S. Ct. 2085 (1993) (No. 92-34) (stating that only four states
remain without some form of statutory contribution rights between joint
tortfeasors); M. Patricia Adamski, Contribution and Settlement in Multiparty Actions
Under Rule 10b-5, 66 IowA L. REv. 533, 536-37 (1981) ("[M]ost states permit contri-
bution among joint tortfeasors to some extent, although there is little uniformity
among the various state statutes- or deisions as to the measure of damages and
effect of a settlement on the right of contribution.").
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tentially disastrous damages.4 7 Although certain cases discuss contribu-
tion as a well-settled right, many secondary issues surround contribution
rights that continue to create confusion and controversy.48
One issue courts face concerning contribution rights is whether to
imply the right'to contribution in actions when the legislature has not yet
addressed the question. 49 . When contribution rights are not expressly
granted by statute, most courts: have refused to grant them to joint wrong-
doers, reasoning that if the legislature intended a right of contribution to
exist, it would have expressly provided for such a right.50 However, some
courts have implied contribution rights when a statute expressly provides
for a cause of action,5 1 and others have implied contribution rights when
the underlying cause of action was also implied.5 2
The United States Supreme Court closely examined the question of
implied contribution rights in Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers
47. Diane P. Carey, Rule lOb-5 Developments-Damages and Contribution, 39
WASH. & LEE L. Ruv. 997, 1010 (1982) (discussing various ways of calculating dam-
ages under Rule 10b-5 and examining contribution and settlement issues sur-
rounding damage awards).
48. See Fischer, supra note 44, at 1824. Fisher discusses several unresolved
problems surrounding contribution including:
1. Whether the availability of contribution is a matter of federal or state
law; 2. Whether pro rata or proportionate contribution is the appropri-
ate measure of loss allocation; 3. Whether settlement will operate as a bar
against a request for contribution by the non-settling defendant against a
settling defendant; 4. H4ow the number of persons who must contribute
to a settlement may be determined; and, 5. The time period within which
an action for contribution must be brought.
Id.
49. For a discussion of implied causes of action in general, see supra notes 43-
48, infra notes 50-64 and accompanying text. For a discussion of implied contribu-
tion rights in Rule 10b-5 cases, see infra notes 65-95 and accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., Mortgages, Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 934 F.2d 209, 213
(9th Cir. 1991) (refusing to imply right of contribution under False Claims Act);
Fleming v. Lind-Waldock & Co., 922 F.2d 20, 27-28 (1st Cir. 1990) (Commodities
Exchange Act); Baker, Watts & Co. v. Miles & Stockbridge, 876 F.2d 1101, 1102-04
(4th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (Securities Act of 1933 § 12(2)); Getty Petroleum Corp.
v. Island Transp. Corp., 862 F.2d 10, 16 (2d Cir. 1988) (Lanham Trade-Mark Act),
cert. denied, 490.U.S. 1006 (1989); Green v. United States Dep't of Labor, 775 F.2d
964, 971 (8th Cir. 1985) (Federal Employees' Compensation Act); Freidman v.
Hartmann, 787 F. Supp. 411, 415-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act).
51. For a discussion of implied contribution in cases involving expressed pri-
vate causes of action, see infra notes 53-61 and accompanying text.
52. For a discussion of the debate as to whether contribution should be im-
plied in an implied cause of action, see infra notes 65-83 and accompanying text.
See generally James S. O'Shaughnessy, Note, Judicial Implication of Contribution Under
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act: Is the New Branch on the Judicial Oak
Threatened by Strict Construction?, 16 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 983 (1982) (discussing how
Supreme Court's strict construction of implied causes of action, especially in Texas
Industries and Northwest Airlines, threatened implied contribution rights under
§ 10(b), and explaining how these cases caused confusion over whether to imply
contribution into implied causes of action).
[Vol. 39: p. 165
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Union5 3 and Texas Industries v. Radcliff Materials, Inc.54 These cases in-
volved statutes that expressly provided for a private cause of action but did
not provide for contribution rights.55 Despite the lack of an express provi-
sion for contribution, the Court determined that a right to contribution
could exist in one of two situations.5 6 First, Congress could expressly or by
clear implication provide for contribution rights. 57 Second, the courts
could adopt a federal common law of contribution.5 8 Under a congres-
sional intent test, the Court held that no right to contribution existed
under the statutes in question. 59 Furthermore, the Court held that no
53. 451 U.S. 77 (1981). In Northwest Airlines, the Court declined to imply a
right to contribution under the Equal Pay Act of 1963 and Title VII of Civil Rights
Act of 1964. Id. at 79.
54. 451 U.S. 630 (1981). In Texas Industries, the Court declined to imply con-
tribution rights under the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Id. at 632. ,
55. See Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 632 (involving cause of action for violation of
Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. .209 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1980))); Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 79 (involving cause of action for violation
of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703, 78 Stat. 255 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988 & Supp. III 1991))). A remedy for violation of the anti-
trust laws involved in Texas Industries was expressly established by the Clayton Act.
Clayton Act, ch 323, § 4, 38 Stat. 731 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 15
(1988)) (stating that "[a]ny person Who shall be injured.., by reason of anything
forbidden in the anti-trust [sic] laws may sue"). The Act is silent regarding contri-
bution. Id.
Likewise, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, at issue in Northwest Airlines, ex-
pressly provides for private actions but not contribution. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f),
2000e-5(g) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). However, Northwest Airlines also involved viola-
tions of the Equal Pay Act, 77 Stat. 56, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988), which does not
expressly provide for a private cause of action or contribution. The Equal Pay Act
allegations were brought under an implied cause of action theory. Northwest Air-
lines, 451 U.S. at 88-89 n.20. The Court refused to imply contribution into express
causes of action and refused to rule on whether or not contribution could be im-
plied from an implied cause of action. Id.
56. Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 638 (citing Northwest Airlines v. Transport Work-
ers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 90-91 (1981)).
57. Id. (stating that "[w]e concluded [in Northwest Airlines] that a right to con-
tribution may arise .. .through the affirmative creation of a right of action by
Congress, either expressly or by clear implication").
58. Id. (stating that "a right to contribution may arise ... through the power
of federal courts to fashion a federal common law of contribution").
59. Id. at 630-47. The' Texas Industries Court relied upon the congressional
intent test derived from Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), and subsequently modi-
fied by California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981).' Texas Industries, 451 U.S. at
639. In Cort, the Court set out the factors to be weighed when considering whether
or not to imply a private cause of action in a federal statute. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.
The factors include: 1) whether the plaintiff was ina class protected by the statute,
2) the legislative intent behind the statute, 3) whether the new remedy is consis-
tent with the legislative scheme and 4) whether the cause of action is appropriately
addressed by federal and not state law. Id. In Sierra Club, the Court emphasized
that the Cort analysis is essentially a congressional intent test. Sierra Club, 451 U.S.
at 297-98 (stating that "the focus of the inquiry is on whether Congress intended to
create a remedy" and that last two Cort factors are only relevant "if the first two
factors give indication of congressional intent to create a remedy"). For a com-
plete discussion of the application of the Cort analysis in Texas Industries and North-
19941
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federal common law should be created unless unique federal interests ex-
isted 6° or Congress had "given the courts the power to develop substantive
law."6 1 Until 1993, the Court would not address the issue of whether or
not contribution could be implied from an implied cause of action.
Rule lOb-5 would be the springboard for contribution to be implied
from an implied cause of action. Once the Supreme Court had defini-
tively recognized the Rule lOb-5 private cause of action, the Court then
had to define and limit the scope of its use. 62 Although Congress has
acted several times to refine and clarify the 1934 Act, it has generally ac-
quiesced to judicial authority in the area of section 10(b). 63 Despite these
developments, neither the Supreme Court nor Congress ever created an
implied right to contribution in the section 10(b) context until Musick.64
west Airlines, see MarkJ. Loewenstein, Implied Contribution Under the Federal Securities
Laws: A Reassessment, 1982 DuKE L.J. 543, 563-67 (1982) (concluding that "a Cort
analysis should not control the question of implied contribution under the securi-
ties laws" because "[i] t is illogical to ask whether Congress ever intended the courts
to infer a right to contribution under section 10(b); because it has never been
demonstrated that Congress ever intended the courts to sanction a private cause of
action in the first instance"). For a more detailed discussion of the Cort test and
subsequent cases reinterpreting the Cort analysis, see Schneider, supra note 33, at
873-96.
60. Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 640-41. Admiralty law is one example of a unique
federal interest where the Court has created an implied right to contribution
based on the long tradition of division of damages in admiralty cases. See Cooper
Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106, 110 (1974) (holding that ship-
owner can seek contribution from joint tortfeasor and stating that "[w] here two
vessels collide due to the fault of each, an admiralty doctrine of ancient lineage
provides that the mutual wrongdoers shall share equally the damages sustained by
each").
61. Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 640. (quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabba-
tino, 376 U.S. 398, 426 (1964)). For a general discussion of the various ways the
United States Supreme Court has developed federal common law, see Henry J.
Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 383,
421 (1964) (concluding that in years since Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, Supreme
Court.has "forged" federal common law into "incalculably useful" tool).
62. For a discussion of Supreme Court cases refining Rule 10b-5, see supra
note 14.
63. See Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 113 S. Ct. 2085,
2089 (1993) (stating that Congress has left task of defining features of Rule 10b-5
actions to courts). For a discussion of congressional modifications of the 1934 Act
that demonstrate congressional acquiescence to judicial control of Rule 10b-5, see
supra note 39 and accompanying text.
64. For a discussion of the development of the implied right to contribution
under § 10(b) in the lower federal courts, see infra notes 69-95 and accompanying
text.
[Vol. 39: p. 165
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C. The History and Debate Concerning the Implied Right to Contribution
Under Rule 10b-5: The Young Oak Grows
In 1968, in deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co.,65 the United States District
Court for the District of Colorado became the first federal court to imply a
right to contribution in a Rule lOb-5 action. 66 Since the deHaas decision,
at least forty-five cases have held that an implied right to contribution ex-
ists under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. 67 Concurrently, however, a mi-
nority of federal courts have refused to imply this right.6
8
1. The Majority View: A Right to Contribution is Properly Implied into Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5
The majority of lower federal courts that have implied a right to con-
tribution have invoked three major rationales. 69 First, many courts have
relied upon other sections of the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act) and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in reasoning that if Congress had ex-
pressly provided for a private cause of action for securities fraud, it would
have also created a right to contribution. 70 Specifically, because section
65. 286 F. Supp. 809 (D. Colo. 1968), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on'other
grounds, 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970).
66. Id. at 8i6 (reasoning that because several express liability provisions in
both Exchange Acts allow contribution, "contribution should be permitted when
liability is implied under Section 10(b)" (citing Securities Exchange Act of 1934
§ 9, 11, 18, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), 77k(f), 78r(b) (1988))).
67. See Brief for Respondents at 7 & n.3, Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employ-
ers Ins. of Wausau, 113 S. Ct. 2085 (1993) (No. 92-34). Some of the most recent
cases from'various circuits recognizing an implied right of contribution under
§ 10(b) include: In rejiffy Lube Securities Litigation, 927 F.2d 155, 160 (4th Cir.
1991); Franklin v. Kaypro Corp., 884 F.2d 1222, 1226 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 890 (1990); Sirota v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 673 F.2d 566, 578 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 838, and cert. denied, 459 U.S. 908 (1982); Huddleston v. Her-
man & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 556-59 (5th Cir. 1981), aff'd in part and revd in part
on other grounds, 459 U.S. 375 (1983); Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330, 334 (7th
Cir.' 1979).
68. See, e.g., Chutich v. Touche Ross & Co., 960 F.2d 721, 722-24 (8th Cir.
1992) (applying analysis of Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries and holding that
no right to contribution exists under § 10(b) or Rule 10b-5); Robin v. Doctors
Officenters Corp., 730 F. Supp. 122, 125 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (finding that "[n]either
the legislative history nor the language of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 supports
an implied right of contribution"); In re Professional Fin. Management, Ltd., 683
F. Supp. 1283, 1286 (D. Minn. 1988) (relying on Northwest Airlines and Texas Indus-
tries to decline to imply right of contribution under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5); see
also King v. Gibbs, 876 F.2d 1275, 1280-81 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating in dicta that in
light of Texas Industries and Northwest Airlines, contribution rights in § 10(b) should
not be recognized).
69. For a discussion of each of the three rationales that courts most com-
monly invoke to support implied contribution rights in Rule 10b-5 actions, see
infra notes 70-83 arid accompanying text.
70. See Heizer, 601 F.2d at 332 ("Inasmuch as three specific liability provisions
include the remedy of contribution, that ancillary remedy should be implied when
the remedy itself has been implied under Section 10(b) . . . and Rule 10b-5.");
deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 286 F. Supp. 809, 816 (D. Colo. 1968) ("Since
1994] 'NOTE
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11(f) of the 1933 Act and sections 9(e) and 18(b) of the 1934 Act ex-
pressly provide for a right to contribution, these courts have reasoned that
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 should also include a right to contribution. 71
For example, in Lampf Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson,72 the
Supreme Court recently ,endorsed the use of express remedial provisions
of other sections of the 1933 and 1934 Acts as analogies for implying simi-
lar provisions in other sections. 73
Second, courts have held that because the judiciary has implied the
underlying cause of action, it also has the authority to provide contribu-
tion rights.7 4 Specifically, these courts have suggested that it would be
unfair for courts to be able to imply a cause of action and then be power-
less to imply a right to contribution for that action. 75 In Heizer Corp. v.
Ross,'76 the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held
that the common law rule against contribution should be "ameliorated"
even when the underlying remedy is implied.77 The Heizer court stated
that "[t] he existence of a statutory right implies the existence of all neces-
sary and appropriate remedies."78
Finally, courts have relied heavily upon the policy considerations sur-
rounding contribution rights to support implying contribution under sec-
the specific liability provisions of the [1934 Act] provide for contribution, it appears
that contribution should be permitted when liability is implied under Section
10(b)."), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970). But see
Baker, Watts & Co. v. Miles & Stockbridge, 876 F.2d 1101, 1105 (4th Cir. 1989)
(arguing that because other sections of Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934 expressly
provide for contribution, "Congress knows how to define such a right of action...
and we infer a lack of congressional intent to do so when the particular provision
at issue is silent as to the existence of such a remedy").
71. See Securities Act of 1933 § 11(f), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(f) (1988) (stating that
"every person who becomes liable to make payment under this section may recover
contribution.., from any person who, if sued separately, would have been liable
to make the same payment"); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 9(e), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78i(e) (1988) (using similar language); id. § 18(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78r(b) (1988)
(using similar language).
72. 111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991).
73. Id. at 2780 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("When the statute of origin contains
comparable express remedial provisions, the inquiry usually should be at an
end."). For a further discussion of the Lampf decision, see supra note 4.
74. Heizer, 601 F.2d at 332 ("The power to make the right of any recovery
effective implies the power to utilize any of the procedures . . . available to the
litigant .... ." (quoting Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 288
(1940))).
75. Id.
76. 601 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1979).
77. Id. The Heizer court relied in part on Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz
Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106, 110-11 (1974) (implying right to contribution from un-
derlying action which was also implied under admiralty law). The Supreme Court
has subsequently limited the applicability of Cooper to admiralty cases. Musick,
Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 113 S. Ct. 2085, 2087 (1993).
78. Heizer, 601 F.2d at 332 (quoting Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396
U.S. 229, 239 (1969)).
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tion 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. 79 In Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean,80 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that "a rule
permitting contribution [under section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5] provides an
equitable result that sufficiently satisfies the objective of deterrence under
the securities laws." 8 1 Supporters of contribution rights argue that without
shared liability, defendants will be pressured to settle or to otherwise face
the consequences of severe damage awards.8 2 In addition, these settle-
ments will not necessarily end litigation because, in multiparty suits, plain-
tiffs will often use settlement funds to-fuel further litigation against non-
settling defendants.8 3
2. The Minority View: Contribution Rights Cannot be Implied into Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5
A minority of courts have refused to imply a right to contribution in
Rule 1Ob-5 actions.8 4 These courts have relied primarily on Texas Indus-
tries and Northwest Airlines for the proposition that federal courts lack any
79. See, e.g., Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 557-58 (5th Cir.
1981) (holding that denying contribution causes "rush to settlement" to avoid
huge damage awards which cannot be divided), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on
other grounds, 459 U.S. 375 (1983); Heizer, 601 F.2d at 332 (holding that deterrence
is enhanced by allowing contribution); Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Serv., Inc.,
318 F. Supp. 955, 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (finding that deterrence is enhanced with
contribution because all wrongdoers are punished), aff'd per curiam, 442 F.2d 1346
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 941 (1971); see also David S. Ruder, Multiple Defend-
ants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto,
Indemnification,.and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 597, 646-65 (1972) (discussing
why allocating liability in multiple defendant cases is fair to defendants). See gener-
ally John H. Langmore & Robert A. Prentice, Contribution Under Section 12 of the
Securities Act of 1933: The Existence and Merits of Such a Right, 40 EMORY L.J. 1015,
1071-92 (1991) (presenting detailed analysis of policy issues presented by contribu-
tion rights and concluding that increasing certainty of punishment through contri-
bution is more effective deterrent than increasing severity of punishment under no
contribution rule).
80. 640 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1981), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds,
459 U.S. 375 (1983).
81. Id. at 559.
82. Id. at 558 ("The disallowance of contribution in the context of ... mod-
em multiparty litigation encourages the presentation of enormous claims against
numerous defendants in the hope that at least some of those named will ... pay a
settlement amount rather than defend the action."). For a further discussion of
this aspect of the policy debate, see supra note 15.
83. Huddleston, 640 F.2d at 558.
84. See, e.g., Chutich v. Touche Ross & Co., 960 F.2d 721, 724 (8th Cir. 1992)
(stating that "we lack federal common law power to create a right of action for
contribution in this case"); Robin v. Doctors Officenters Corp., 730 F. Supp. 122,
125 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (holding that "[n]either the legislative history nor the language
of Section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 supports an implied right of contribution"); In re
Professional Fin. Management, Ltd., 683 F..Supp. 1283, 1286 (D. Minn. 1988) (ap-
plying factors set forth in Texas Industries and Northwest Airlines and finding that no
right to contribution exists under § 10(b) because "Congress ... did not intend to
provide for contribution under th[at] section[ ]").
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statutory or common law basis for implying a contribution right.85 In
Texas Industries and Northwest Airlines, the Supreme Court declined to im-
ply a right of contribution into statutes that provided an express private
right of action.8 6 As stated earlier, the Court declined to imply a contribu-
tion right on the basis that no express or implied congressional intent to
provide contribution rights existed; and that any extension of federal com-
mon law to create contribution rights would be inappropriate. 87 Lower
federal courts were uncertain, however, as to whether the tests utilized by
Texas Industries and Northwest Airlines should apply in the context of implied
private causes of action.8 8
Some courts have applied these tests to implied causes of action, rea-
soning that if they did not, a double standard would result.8 9 In Chutich v.
Touche Ross & Co.,90 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit held that under Texas Industries and Northwest Airlines, "federal
courts are powerless to create a right of action for contribution among
violators of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without a statutory or federal
common law basis." 9 1
In addition, some courts that have refused to imply contribution
rights under Rule lOb-5 emphasize the countervailing policy reasons for
85. For a full discussion of Texas Industries and Northwest Airlines, see supra
notes 53-61 and accompanying text. See also Baker, Watts & Co. v. Miles & Stock-
bridge, 876 F.2d 1101, 1104 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding no implied right of contribu-
tion in action brought under § 12(2) of the 1933 Act based in part on Supreme
Court's analysis in Texas Industries and Northwest Airlines).'
86. Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 646-47 (1981);
Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 98 (1981).
87. See Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 638. For a further discussion of these tests, see
supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
88. Compare Baker v. BP Am., Inc., 749 F. Supp..840, 844 (N.D. Ohio 1990)
(reading Texas Industries and Northwest Airlines to apply only to express statutory
causes of action) and In re National Student Marketing Litig., 517 F. Supp. 1345,
1348-49 (D.D.C. 1981) (reading Texas Industries and Northwest Airlines as limited to
the statutory schemes presented therein and holding that implied right to contri-
bution under § 10(b) exists) with Chutich, 960 F.2d at 722 (concluding that Texas
Industries and Northwest Airlines restrict "the implication of contribution rights
under securities laws") and Professional Fin. Management, 683 F. Supp. at 1286-87
("The factors identified in Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries indicate that [a
right to contribution under § 10(b)] should not be implied.") and King v. Gibbs,
876 F.2d 1275, 1280-82 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting in dicta that after Texas Industries
and Northwest Airlines, analysis in .Heizer, the leading Seventh Circuit case support-
ing contribution under § 10(b), was questionable, and also concluding that there
should be no implied right of action for indemnification under § 10(b) and-Rule
lob-5).
89. Chutich, 960 F.2d at 723 (discussing double standard that would be cre-
ated if Texas Industries test was not also applied to implied causes of action by stat-
ing that "[a]lthough courts would follow the Texas Industries analysis in cases
involving express private rights of action, courts would be free to create new rights
of action like contribution regardless of statutory or common law authority in cases
in which the courts had initially implied the private right of action").
90. 960 F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1992).
91. Id. at 723.
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denying these rights. 92 These courts have reasoned that a "no contribu-
tion" rule actually generates more effective deterrence because the risk of
catastrophic loss is enhanced.9 3 In Chutich, however, the Eighth Circuit
declined to reach such policy considerations after deciding that federal
courts do not have the power to create a right to contribution.9 4 More-
over, because contribution has historically been denied to defendants who
have acted with scienter, the minority of courts refusing to imply contribu-
tion have maintained that contribution should not be extended to Rule
lOb-5 defendants because scienter is required under Rule lOb-5.9 5
III. ANALYSIS OF THE MUslIcK DECISION
A. The Musick Case:' Facts and Procedural History
In 1984, stock purchasers of Cousins Home Furnishings, Inc., a Cali-
fornia corporation, brought a class action in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of California against the issuing company,
its parent company, several officers and directors and two lead underwrit-
ers.9 6 The shareholders alleged violations of federal securities laws and
California corporation law in connection with a 1983 stock offering.9 7
The attorneys and accountants involved in the corporation's stock offering
were not named in the original action.9 8 All of the defendants settled with
the stockholders for $13.5 million, of which $13 million was paid by Em-
92. See, e.g., Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 638 (1981)
(holding that contribution results "in additional trial and pretrial proceedings,
thus adding new complications to what already is complex litigation" (citing Illi-
nois Brick Co., v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 737-47 (1977))); WILLIAM M. LANDES &
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 201-04 (1987) (out-
lining various problems that arise under contribution).
93. See In re Olympia Brewing Co. Sec. Litig., 674 F. Supp. 597, 616 n.20 (N.D.
Ill. 1987) ("[C]ontemporary analysis exists indicating that a rule denying contribu-
tion in section 10(b) cases may provide as great a deterrent to future wrongdoing
as a rule permitting contribution." (citing Frank H. Easterbrook et al., Contribution
Among Antitrust Defendants: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 23 J.L. & ECoN. 331
(1980) (discussing incentives to settle under various rules of contribution))).
94. Chutich, 960 F.2d at 724 ("Like the Supreme Court, we recognize policy 'is
a matter for Congress, not the courts, to resolve.' ".(quoting Texas Indus. v. Rad-
cliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 646 (1981))).
95. See In re Professional Fin. Management,.Ltd., 683 F. Supp. 1283, 1287 (D.
Minn. 1988) ("Because scienter is required for liability under Rule lOb-5, it is...
not unfair to deny contribution in such actions." (citing MarkJ. Loewenstein, Im-
plied Contribution Under the Federal Securities Laws: A Reassessment, 1982 DuKE LJ.
543, 573 (1982))). The Supreme Court has held that scienter is required under
Rule 10b-5. See Ernst & Erst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (holding no
action for damages will lie under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in 'absence of any allega-
tion of intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud).
96. Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 113 S. Ct. 2085,
2086 (1993).
97. Id. The allegations included violations of §§ 11 and 12 of the 1933 Act
and § 10(b) of the 1934 Act. Id.
98. Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Musick, Peeler & Garrett, 954 F.2d 575, 576
(9th Cir. 1992), aff'd, 113 S. Ct. 2085 (1993).
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ployers Insurance of Wausau, provide the indemnity insurance to all but
two of the defendants. 99 The settlement agreement contained a release
from liability, including a release of claims by the stockholders against the
accountants and attorneys of the insureds. 100 Employers Insurance of
Wausau, subrogated to the rights of the defendants, brought an action for
contribution against the attorneys and accountants who were involved in
the original transaction.10 1 Employers Insurance alleged that the account-
ants and attorneys were jointly responsible for the securities fraud
violations. 102
The district court dismissed the action, reasoning that because the
defendants had all paid their "fair share," no contribution right existed. 10 3
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, hold-
ing that although the defendants had paid their "fair share" of the dam-
ages in proportion to all of the defendants before the district court, they
had paid more than their "fair share" in proportion to all the joint wrong-
doers, which included the accountants and attorneys not originally named
as defendants.1 0 4
Three months after the Ninth Circuit decision in Employers Insurance of
Wausau v. Musick, Peeler & Garrett, the Eighth Circuit, in Chutich v. Touche
Ross & Co., held that no right to contribution existed in a Rule 1Ob-5 ac-
tion.10 5 The attorneys and accountants, who were the defendants in Em-
ployers Insurance, petitioned the Supreme Court to resolve the circuit split,
arguing that no right to contribution should exist in a Rule lOb-5 ac-
tion.10 6 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Musick on the issue of
whether defendants may seek contribution from joint tortfeasors in an ac-
tion based on an implied private right of action under section 10 (b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and' Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission.10 7
99. Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2086.
100. Employers Ins., 954 F.2d at 577. This was done even though the statute of
limitations had run on claims by the plaintiff.class against the non-party lawyers
and accountants. Id.
101. Musick, 113.S. Ct. at 2086.
102. Id.
103. Employers Ins., 954 F.2d at 577.
104. Id. at 578 (stating that "[i]' is axiomatic that a defendant may pay her fair
share relative to other parties in the suit and yet pay more than her fair share
relative to the universe of all joint tortfeasors").
105. 960 F.2d 721, 724 (1992).
106. Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2087.
107. Id. ("We grant[ ] (petitioner's request] for a writ of certiorari on the sole
question presented: 'Whether federal courts may imply a private right to contribu-
tion in Section 10(b) ... and Rule 10b-5'" (quoting original grant of certiorari,
Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 113 S. Ct. 54 (1992))).
[Vol. 39: p. 165
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B. The Majority Opinion: Justice Kennedy Waters the Oak
The United States.Supreme Court, in a 6-3 decision, resolved the cir-
cuit split by holding that defendants in a Rule 10b-5 action have a right to
seek contribution as a matter of federal law. 10 8 The Court reached this
conclusion by determining that federal courts have the authority to imply
a right to contribution, and that a right to contribution is within the pa-
rameters of the Rule 10b-5 action. 109
1. Federal Courts Have the Authority to Imply a Right to Contribution
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy set forth a two-pronged ra-
tionale for granting federal courts the authority to imply a right to contri-
bution.1 10 First, Justice Kennedy stated that once courts have implied the
underlying liability of the Rule 10b-5 action, they should not be denied the
authority to imply contribution actions." 1 Second, Justice Kennedy
opined that Congress left the power to imply contribution rights to the
courts by explicitly recognizing judicial authority in this area." 12
Justice Kennedy's first point focused on an analysis of precedent sur-
rounding contribution rights in federal law." 3 . Recognizing that the
Court declined to provide for a contribution right in Texas Industries and
Northwest Airlines, Justice Kennedy distinguished these cases on the basis
that the underlying actions in both cases were created by express statutory
provisions.11 4 Justice Kennedy reasoned that because Congress expressly
created the causes of action involved in Texas Industries and Northwest Air-
lines, Congress would have expressly included contribution rights if it so
desired. 115 Because the Rule 101>5 action is impliedJustice Kennedy con-
cluded that it would be wholly inappropriate to examine congressional
intent.l16
108. Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2086.
109. Id. at 2087-92.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 2088 ("Having implied the underlying liability in the first place, to
now disavow any authority to allocate it... would be most unfair to those against
whom damages are assessed.").
112. Id. at 2089 (stating that prior congressional responses to Supreme Court
decisions involving Rule 10b-5 "not only treat[ ] the lOb-5 action as an accepted
feature of our securities laws, but avoid[ I entangling Congress in its formulation.
That task... Congress has left to us.").
113. Id. at 2088-89.
114. Id. at 2087-88 ("[T]he instruction we receive from [Texas Industries and
Northwest Airlines] is that they are distinguishable from.., the maiter now before
us. The federal interests in both [cases] were defined by statutory provisions that
were express in creating the substantive damages liability for which contribution
was sought.").
115. Id. at 2088.
116. Id. Justice Kennedy stated that because a private right of action under
Rule 10b-5 was implied, "it would be futile to ask whether the 1934 Congress also
displayed a clear intent to create a contribution right collateral to the remedy." Id.
Later in his opinion,Justice Kennedy addressed this issue by noting that," 'where a
1994]
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After summarily establishing that Texas Industries and Northwest Airlines
were not controlling, Justice Kennedy still faced the issue of whether it was
appropriate for the Court to create an entirely new cause of action for
contribution in the Rule 10b-5 context. 117 Justice Kennedy held that it
was appropriate for the Court to do so because he considered the right to
contribution "ancillary" to the Rule 10b-5 private cause of action.1 18
The second prong of Kennedy's rationale for granting authority to
the federal courts to imply a right to contribution rested on an analysis of
congressional action recognizing judicial authority in this area.11 9 Specifi-
cally, Justice Kennedy observed that Congress enacted the Insider Trading
and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, which expressly refused to
limit any cause of action "implied from a provision of this chapter."1 20
Also, Justice Kennedy noted that in responding to the Supreme Court's
decision in Lampf by legislatively limiting the retroactive effect of the
Lampf holding, Congress had explicidy recognized the Court's power to
imply a statute of limitations.12 1
2. A Right to Contribution Is Within the Contours of the Rule 10b-5 Action
After establishing that federal courts have the authority to imply a
right to contribution, the Musick Court had to determine whether it
should actually establish the right. 122 Once Justice Kennedy determined
that the right to contribution was "ancillary" to the Rule 10b-5 implied
private right of action, he then examined the objectives and purposes of
the 1934 Securities Exchange Act. 123 Based upon an examination of the
overall structure of the 1934 Act and an analysis of comparable sections
legal structure of private statutory rights has developed without clear indications of
congressional intent,' a federal court has the limited power to 'define the contours
of that structure.' " Id. at 2089 (quoting Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 111
S. Ct. 2749, 2764 (1991)).
117. Id. at 2088.
118. Id. ("The violation of the securities laws gives rise to the lOb-5 private
cause of action, and the question before us is the ancillary one of how damages are
to be shared among persons or entities already subject to that liability.").
119. Id. at 2089. For a complete discussion of congressional action concern-
ing § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, see supra notes 4, 39 and accompanying text and infra
notes 183-85 and accompanying text.
120. Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2089 (citing Insider Trading and Securities Enforce-
ment Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-107, § 20A(d), 102 Stat. 4680 (1988)). Justice
Kennedy stated that "[t] he existence of [the Rule 10b-5] action, and our cumulative
work in its design, have been obvious legislative considerations in the enactment of
[the Insider Trading and Securities Enforcement Act of 1988]." Id. For a discus-
sion of the 1988 Act, see supra note 39 and accompanying text.
121. Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2089. For a discussion of the congressional response
to Lampf see supra note 4 and accompanying text.
122. Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2089.
123. Id. at 2089-90 ("Our task is not to assess the relative merits of the com-
peting [policy issues surrounding contribution], but rather to attempt to infer how
the 1934 Congress would have addressed the issue had the 10b-5 action been in-
cluded as an express provision in the 1934 Act.").
184 [Vol. 39: p. 165
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within it, Justice Kennedy concluded that an implied right to contribution
was consistent with the objectives of the 1934 Act. 12 4
Specifically, Justice Kennedy focused on sections 9 and 18 of the 1934
Act because these sections involved the same protections and were moti-
vated by the same rationale underlying the adoption of section 10(b). 12 5
Justice Kennedy noted that defendants in a section 9 or 18 claim stand in a
similar position to Rule. 10b-5 defendants for purposes of contribution
rights. 126 Also, all three sections of the 1934 Act were enacted by the 73rd
Congress.1 27 Because sections 9 and 18 expressly provide for contribu-
tion, the Court held that if a private remedy had been granted under sec-
tion 10(b), the 73rd Congress would have adopted a right to contribution
as well.1 28
Kennedy also recognized that the vast majority of lower federal courts
have adopted the contribution right.1 29 He considered this important be-
cause even though the right to contribution for.Rule lOb-5 cases had been
in existence for over twenty years, "neither the Securities and Exchange
Commission nor the federal courts have suggested that the contribution
right detracts from the effectiveness of the lOb-5 implied action or inter-
feres with the effective operation of the securities laws." 130
124. Id. at 2091. Although admitting that "[ilnquiring about what a given
Congress might have done, [is] not a promising venture," Justice Kennedy rea-
soned that because (1) the language of § 10(b) "provides little'guidance" towards
refining specific elements of Rule lOb-5 actions and (2) little evidence of actual
congressional intent exists, examining comparable sections of the 1934 Act "does
in this case yield an answer we find convincing." Id. at 2090.
125. Id. The Court noted that the three sections are close in "structure, pur-
pose and intent." Id. The Court continued by stating that "[e]ach confers an ex-
plicit right of action in favor of. private parties and, in so doing, discloses a
congressional intent regarding the' definition and apportionment of liability
among private parties." Id.
126. Id. at 2090-91 ("All three 'causes 'of action [under §§ 9, 18 and 10(b)]
impose direct liability on defendants for their own acts as opposed to derivative
liability for the acts of others; all three involve defendants who have violated the
securities law with scienter; [and] all three operate in many instances to impose
liability on multiple defendants acting in concert ..... " (citations omitted)). ,
127. Id. at 2091 (noting that some sections of 1934 Act, such as § 20A, which
was added in 1988, should not be examined to determine congressional intent of
1934 Congress).
128. Id. The Court stated that "[g]iven the identity of purpose behind §§ 9,
10(b) and 18, and similarity in their operation, we find no ground for ruling that
allowing contribution in lOb-5 actions will frustrate the purposes of the statutory
section from which it is derived." Id.
129. Id. For a discussion of the lower federal courts that have adopted contri-
bution rights in Rule 101>5 actions, see supra notes 84-95 and accompanying text.
130. Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2091.
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C. The Dissenting Opinion: Justice Thomas Refuses to "Cultivate this New
Branch of Rule 10b-5 Law"
Justice Thomas, joined by Justices Blackmun and O'Connor, wrote
the dissent and argued that Congress never intended for an implied right
of contribution to exist in Rule 10b-5 actions and, therefore, the Court was
overstepping its authority by creating such a right.13 ' Justice Thomas re-
lied on three rationales to support his position.13 2 First, Justice Thomas
stated that the Court should have declined to create a completely new
private right of action for contribution in Rule 10b-5 actions without find-
ing compelling reasons for doing so. 133 Justice Thomas reasoned that the
Court should continue its judicial policy of limiting the scope of the Rule
10b-5 action.1 34
Second, Justice Thomas contended that the majority was incorrect in
holding that the right to contribution is an "ancillary" element of the im-
plied cause of action.' 3 5 InsteadJustice Thomas characterized a right to
contribution as an entirely separate cause of action.' 3 6 In addition, he
argued that because no common law right to contribution exists and juris-
dictions that recognize contribution rights rely on legislation to establish
such rights, the Court was overstepping its bounds by creating a new cause
of action.13 7 Justice Thomas distinguished Lampf by explaining that a stat-
ute of limitations was a necessary and ancillary part of any action, whereas
a right to contribution was not.'3 8
Third, Justice Thomas asserted that the majority used the wrong
methodology for determining congressional intent.13 9 Justice Thomas ar-
gued that a proper analysis would have focused on the express language of
131. Id. at 2092 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 2092-95 (Thomas, J., dissenting). For a discussion of each of Jus-
tice Thomas' rationales, see infra notes 133-45 and accompanying text.
133. Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2093 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas
stated that "[ijn the absence of any compelling reason to allow contribution in
private lOb-5 suits, we should seek to keep 'the breadth' of the lOb-5 action from
'growing beyond the scope congressionally intended.'" Id. (quoting Virginia
Bankshares, Inc., v. Sandberg, 111 S. Ct. 2749, 2765 (1991)).
134. Id. (Thomas,J., dissenting) (citing Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg,
111 S. Ct. 2749, 2765 (1991), and citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. 723, 749 (1975)).
135. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
136. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Unlike a statute of limitations, a reliance
requirement or a defense to liability ... contribution requires a wholly separate
cause of action.").
137. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("A court that recognizes an implied right to
contribution must endorse a remedy contrary to the common law and perhaps
even the legislative policy of the relevant jurisdiction.").
138. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 2093-94 (ThomasJ., dissenting) ("[T]he Court errs in placing dis-
positive weight on the existence of contribution rights under §§ 9 and 18 of the
Act. The proper analysis flows from our well-established approach to implied
causes of action in general and to implied rights of contribution in particular."
(citation omitted)).
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section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 and the "structure of the statutory
scheme." 140 According to Justice Thomas, an analysis of the language of
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, and the statutory scheme, "negates the exist-
ence of a lOb-5 contribution action."1 4 1 Justice Thomas construed section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to protect the individual victims of fraud, and not to
protect the interests of joint tortfeasors. 1 42 Moreover, Justice Thomas ar-
gued that an analysis of the structure of the 1934 Act revealed that if Con-
gress wanted to provide for a right of contribution, it could have done so
expressly.143 Instead, Congress only expressly provided for contribution
in certain sections of the 1934 Act.1 44 In addition, Justice Thomas ob-
served that Congress has had numerous opportunities to adopt the right
to contribution for Rule 10b-5 actions but has failed to do so. 145
IV. CRITICAL ANALYSis: A TREE CANNOT GROW IN THE SAND
This Note contends that the Musick majority's conclusions rest on as-
sertions that may lead to an equitable result, but that do not rest on the
granite foundation of Supreme Court precedent or clear congressional
intent. The Musick majority held that: (1) the Supreme Court has the
power to create a new cause of action for contribution without congres-
sional consent 146 and (2) contribution should be allowed in the section
10(b) context simply because two other similar provisions of the 1934 Act
provide for contribution.' 4 7
140. Id. at 2095 (ThomasJ, dissenting) (quoting Northwest Airlines v. Trans-
port Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 91 (1981)).
141. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
142. Id. (Thomas,J., dissenting) (explaining that "only actual purchasers and
sellers of securities are entitled to press private 10b-5 suits," and arguing that, if
majority view was taken, 10b-5's "requirement of actual purchase or sale would
virtually evaporate in ... contribution dispute [s] embroiling only separate groups
of professionals who had merely advised or facilitated a tainted securities transac-
tion" and concluding that this undermines intent of Congress and SEC).
143. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("When Congress wished to provide a [con-
tribution] remedy... it had little trouble in doing so expressly." (quoting Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 734 (1975))).
144. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting presence of express contribution
rights under §§ 9 and 18 of the 1934 Act).
145. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) Justice Thomas cited the Insider Trading
and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 and the limitation of the Lampf
decision in Amendment 27A of the 1934 Act for the proposition that if Congress
wanted to provide for contribution rights for 10b-5 defendants, "a single enact-
ment could have given effect to this policy." Id. For a further discussion of these
congressional actions, see supra notes 4, 39 and accompanying text.
146. Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 113 S. Ct. 2085,
2087-89 (1993).
147. Id. at 2089-92.
19941
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A. The Supreme Court's Power to Create an Action for Contribution
The Musick majority held that the Supreme Court has the power to
create a cause of action for contribution in Rule 10b-5 actions. 148 The
Musick majority supported its holding simply by labelling contribution in
the section 10(b) context as an "ancillary" claim, thereby distinguishing a
strong line of cases that caution against creating new causes of action. 149
The Court admitted that "the creation of new rights ought to be left
to legislatures, not courts."150 Justice Kennedy also conceded that,
whether created by state statute or by common law, "in both instances the
right [to contribution] is thought to be a separate or independent cause of
action."' 51 However, he then added that this "separate or independent"
cause of action was "ancillary" to the 10b-5 action.'5 2
Consequently, the Court now has precedent for implying new causes
of action simply by classifying the cause of action as "ancillary."' 53 Be-
cause the Court has provided no identifiable test for determining when a
right is "ancillary" to a 10b-5 claim, it would appear that indemnification
rights could be just as "ancillary" to a Rule 10b-5 claim as contribution
rights. Implying indemnification right, however, would be contrary to
the weight of authority denying such a right in securities actions.154
148. Id.
149. Id. at 2088 (citing Universities Research Ass'n, Inc. v. Coutu, 450 U.S.
754, 770 (1981); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16
(1979); and Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575-77 (1979), for
proposition that "creation of new rights ought to be left to legislatures, not courts,"
but distinguishing those cases by stating that "the question before us is the ancil-
lary one of how damages are to be shared among persons or entities already sub-
ject to ... liability").
150. Id.
151., Id.
152. Id. ("The violation of the securities laws gives rise to the 10b-5 private
cause of action, and-the question before us is the ancillary one of how damages are
to be shared among persons or entities already subject to that liability.").
153. SeeJoseph M. Hassett, Aiding and Abetting Liability for l0b-5 Violations, REv.
SEC. & COMMODITIES REG., Sept. 15, 1993, at 152, 154. Hassett ignores Justice Ken-
nedy's use of the "ancillary" terminology and states that:
The Court's decision.., in Musick ... shows that the Court is prepared to
create an entirely new private right of action, without any indication of
congressional intent that it do so, in order to discharge what [the Court]
sees as its responsibility to tend to the development of the judicially-cre-
ated doctrines surrounding [R]ule lOb-5 liability.
Id.
154. See Employers Ins. v. Musick, Peeler & Garrett, 954 F.2d 575, 580 (9th
Cir. 1992) (stating that there is "a long-standing bar against claims for indemnifica-
tion in securities cases"), aff'd, 113 S. Ct. 2085 (1993); In re Olympia Brewing Co.
Sec. Litig., 674 F. Supp. 597, 611 (N.D. Ill. 1987) ("[T]he federal courts consistently
state that indemnity is not available in cases of intentional violation of the federal
securities laws .... "). The cases denying implied indemnification rights rely on
the policy reasons set forth in Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 418 F.2d 1276,
1288-89 (2d Cir. 1969) (refusing to grant indemnification rights in order to pro-
mote enforcement of federal securities laws and deter negligence), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 913 (1970). However, some courts have. relied, on a lack ofjudicial authority,
[Vol. 39: p. 165
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The majority's understanding of congressional inaction, inferring
that no action means approval of judicial action, may be appropriate for
determining that Congress approves of the Rule 10b-5 cause of action gen-
erally. 155 However, congressional inaction does not necessarily signify
congressional approval of ajudicially created new cause of action. 156 Even
if Congress remains silent after Musick, the Court should not infer con-
gressional approval of implying new causes of action.
157
B. Application of Judicial Power to Create a Cause of Action for Contribution
Under Section 1 O(b)
After determining that federal courts can create an implied cause of
action for contribution, the Musick majority then specifically held that con-
tribution rights existed for defendants in Rule 10b-5 cases.' 58 The Musick
majority set forth a framework for shaping the Rule 10b-5 action that re-
lied on sections 9 and 18 of the 1934 Act as models for section 10(b),
thereby reaffirming the Court's methodology in Lampf Pleva,. Lipkind, Pru-
pis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson.159
not policy concerns,, to deny implication of indemnification rights. 'See, e.g., Olym-
pia Brewing, 674 F. Supp. at 612 & n.12 (holding that no judicial authority exist to
create action for indemnity under security laws). These courts might now argue
that they can avoid the Texas Industries and Northwest Airlines strict test for implying
causes of action simply by holding that the indemnification claim is ancillary to the
original cause of action.
155. Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2089 (concluding, after analysis of references to
Rule 10b-5 in recent amendments to securities laws, that Court can "infer from
these references an acknowledgement of the lob-5 action Without any further ex-
pression of legislative intent to define it").
156. See Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.,
114 S. Ct. 1439, 1452-53 (1994) (holding that private plaintiff may not maintain
action for aiding and abetting under § 10(b)). In Central Bank, Justice Kennedy,
once again writing for the majority, stated that congressional failure to act does
not represent "affirmative congressional approval of the [courts'] statutory inter-
pretation," and that "congressional inaction cannot amend a duly enacted statute."
Id. at 1453 (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 175 & n.1
(1989)).
157. Id. (explaining, in context of aiding and abetting liability, that Court
should not infer that "Congress[ 1, by silence, hats] acquiesced in the judicial inter-
pretation of § 10(b)"). For a discussion of possible congressional action to finally
reform Rule 10b-5, see infra notes 183-85 and accompanying text.
158. Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2091-92.
159. Id. at 2091 (concluding that "these explicit provisions for contribution
[in.§§ 9 and 18 of the 1934 Act] are an important, not an inconsequential, feature
of the federal securities laws and that consistency requires us to adopt a like contri-
bution iule for the right'of action existing tinder Rule lOb-5"); see Lampf, Pleva,
Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773, 2780-81 (1991) (concluding that
"where ... the claim asserted is one implied under a statute that also contains an
express cause of action . . . , a court should look first to the statute of origin to
ascertain the proper limitations period," and using §§ 9 and 18 of 1934 Act as
models to adopt statute of limitations for Rule 10b-5); see alsoJohn C. Coffee,Jr.,
Aiding, Abetting Liabilities Uncertain Future, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 30, 1993, at 5 (stating that
Supreme Court "shape [s]. the 'contours' of the implied cause of action under Rule
10b-5 by looking to the most closely analogous ixpress causes of action in the 1934
25
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Comparisons between section 10(b) and sections 9 and 18 of the 1934
Act are problematic for two main reasons. First, the sections are not, in
fact, totally analogous, as Justice Kennedy explained in his dissent in
Lampf because "[n]either [section 9 or 18] relates to a cause of action of
the scope and coverage of an implied action under § 10(b). Nor does
either rest on the common law fraud model underlying most § 10(b)
actions."160
Second, the language of sections 9 and 18, which provides for contri-
bution, indicates that these two sections envision separate causes of action
for contribution. 16 1 These separate causes of action may even be brought
by plaintiffs who were previously denied the right to bring an action under
Rule lOb-5.16 2 This is inconsistent with characterizing contribution as an
"ancillary" claim.
The Musick Court worked diligently to frame the rationale behind
granting contribution rights in Rule 10b-5 actions within a strict statutory
construction analysis, purposefully attempting to avoid questions of public
policy. 163 However, Justice Kennedy revealed the true impetus of the ma-
jority's decision when he stated, "[h]aving implied the underlying liability
in the first place, to now disavow any authority to allocate it on the theory
Act," and that after Musick "§§ 9 and 18 of the 1934 Act [have been] enshrined as
the official models to which the implied cause of action under Rule 10b-5 must
conform").
160. Lampf 111 S. Ct. at 2789 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("It is of even greater
importance to note that both of the statutes in question [§§ 9 and 18] relate to
express causes of action which in their purpose and underlying rationale differ
from causes of action implied under § 10(b).").
161. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 9(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1988); id.
§ 18(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78r(b) (1988) (providing that "[elvery person who becomes
liable to make payment under this section may recover contribution as in cases of
contract from any person who, ifjoined in the original suit, would have been liable
to make the same payment"). The language "ifjoined in the original suit" can be
interpreted as explicitly providing for the possibility of separate causes of action
for contribution. See Employers Ins. v. Musick, Peeler & Garrett, 954 F.2d 575, 577
(9th Cir. 1992) (using this analysis to hold that contribution is not limited to par-
ties involved in original suit), aff'd, 113 S. Ct. 2085 (1993).
162. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 754-55 (1975)
(limiting class of persons eligible to maintain action under Rule 101>5 to actual
buyers and sellers of securities); Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2095 (Thomas,J., dissenting)
(arguing that "contribution is inconsistent with our established views of the lOb-5
action" and stating that "Blue Chip Stamps' requirement of actual purchase or sale
would virtually evaporate in a contribution dispute embroiling only separate
groups of professionals who had merely advised or facilitated a tainted securities
transaction").
163. Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2089 (stating that although "[t]he parties have de-
voted considerable portions of their briefs to debating whether a rule of contribu-
tion or of no contribution is more efficient or more equitable ... we decline to
[rule on those matters] here"). Justice Thomas, in dissent, also avoidedquestions
of public policy. Id. at 2095-96 (Thomas, J., diqsenting) (arguing that Court
should decline invitation to join "vigorous debate over the advantages and disad-
vantages of contribution and various contribution schemes" (quoting Texas Indus.
v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 638 (1981))).
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that Congress has not addressed the issue would be most unfair to those
against whom damages are assessed." 164 If the Musick decision is, in fact,
policy based, the Court is improperly practicing judicial legislation, and
even if the Musick decision is not policy based, implying a right to contri-
bution in Rule lOb-5 actions will have diverse policy implications. 165
Either way, policy issues are more appropriately addressed by Congress. 16 6
The Musick decision may be, finally, an invitation to Congress to legislate
in this field.167
V. IMPACT
Musick resolves a split among the United States Courts of Appeals and
conclusively establishes contribution rights for defendants in Rule 10b-5
cases. 168 The Musick decision will have important ramifications on future
164. Id. at 2088; seeJoseph M. Hassett, Contribution in Rule 10b-5 Cases: Musick,
Peeler and Beyond, 9 INSIGHTs 22 (Prentice Hall L. & Bus., Sept. 1993). Hassett
argues that policy considerations were involved in the Musick outcome, but he also
states that:
[H]aving castigated the development of implied private rights of action
under the securities laws as legislative policy-making by judges, a majority
of the Court is uneasy about legislating its own policy on contribution. It
feels better about the enterprise if it is described, not as legislating, but as
divining how Congress would have legislated had it had the prescience to
do so.
Id.
165. SeeJohn H. Langmore & Robert A. Prentice, Contribution Under Section 12
of the Securities'Act of 1933: The Existence and Merits of Such a Right 40 EMORY L.J.
1015, 1098-1107 (1991) (discussing issues concerning who can sue for contribu-
tion and how to apportion liability among settling parties and other wrongdoers in
context of § 12 of 1933 Act).
166. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).- In this case, the Court
suggested that policy decisions are better left to Congress and the executive
branch, stating:
The choice we are urged to make is a matter of high policy for resolution
within the legislative process after the kind of investigation, examination,
and study that legislative bodies can provide and courts cannot. That
process involves the balancing of competing values and' interests, which
in our democratic system is the business of elected representatives.
Id. at 317.
167. See Hassett, supra note 164, at 22 (arguing that Court in Musick "subtly
focused attention on the fact that the present Congress should be resolving the
many important policy decisions as to 'how liability for federal securities fraud
should be fairly allocated among multiple wrongdoers"); Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A.
Groskaufmanis, Musick Clarified Defendants' Obligations, 15 NAT'L L.J., Aug. 30, 1993,
at 21 (arguing that Congress may step in because of broad scope of Musick deci-
sion, stating "[t] here were few echoes in the Musick decision of earlier pronounce-
ments by the [C]ourt about the need to restrain the reach of burgeoning Rule 10b-
5 litigation. Instead, the [C] ourt concluded that 'Congress has left to us' the task of
formulating the parameters of Rule lob-5 actions." (footnotes omitted)); see also
Coffee, supra note 159, at 5 (speculating that "[a]t some point, Congress could get
fed up" with Supreme Court's regulation of Rule 10b-5).
168. Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. 'Employers Ins. of Wausau, 113 S. Ct. 2085,
2087-92 (1993).
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actions brought under 'Rule 1Ob-5 because the case clearly provides a
framework for analysis in cases where the scope of Rule 1Ob-5 is at issue.1
69
Within this framework, either the Supreme Court or Congress will have to
address many controversial questions.' 70 In the meantime, courts will in-
consistently apply securities laws, thus causing some confusion about Rule
1Ob-5 actions until Congress, the Supreme Court or the SEC develop uni-
form rules for contribution under section 10(b). 171
In addition, the Musick decision will have an important impact on the
unsettled law regarding settlements in securities litigation, especially be-
cause parties settle a large majority of claims brought under Rule lOb-5.1 72
In order to accomplish secure settlements, the parties usually attempt to
obtain a judicial order that bars contribution claims from non-settling de-
fendants.' 7 3 Federal law in this area is divided as to the proper method
for applying these settlement bars. 174 Accordingly, either the Supreme
Court or Congress will need to determine whether or not a rule of settle-
ment bar exists for Rule lOb-5 actions.
Heated issues surround settlements and contribution bars, including
the choice of methods for calculating the extent to which settlement
169. Id. at 2090-92 (reaffirming method of determining scope of§ 10(b) that
requires courts to examine analogous sections of 1934 Act). The Court used this
framework for shaping the contours of Rule 1Ob-5 in the Lampf decision. See
Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991); see
also Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988) (holding that reliance is re-
quired under § 10(b) and stating that § 18(a), which expressly requires reliance, is
appropriate model for § 10(b)).
170. See Hassett, supra note 164, at 22 (discussing questions raised by Musick
decision and stating that issues "will ultimately have to be resolved by the Supreme
Court or Congress"); see also Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630,
646 (1981) ("The range of factors to be weighed in deciding whether a right'to
contribution should exist demonstrates the inappropriateness of judicial resolu-
tion of this complex issue.").
171. See Hearings, supra note 15, at 1-27 (opening statements of members of
Senate Committee discussing critical need for reform of private securities litiga-
tion, especially § 10(b), and recognizing "enormous controversy" surrounding pri-
vate litigation of securities laws).
172. See Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 167, at 26 (explaining that parties
settle majority of securities class actions "primarily to put the risk, expense and
distractions 'of litigation behind them").
173. Id.
174. See generally Paul H. Dawes et al., The Effect of Indemnity and Contribution
Upon Partial Settlements in Federal Securities Actions, PRAcrICING L. INST., Sept. 1, 1989,
at 345 (explaining effects of indemnity and contribution on securities action settle-
ments). No federal statute provides for a settlement bar rule. Id. Federal courts
have treated settlement bars differently. See, e.g., Nelson v. Bennett, 662 F. Supp.
1324, 1338 (E.D. Cal. 1987) (creating rule for settlement bars); First Fed; Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon & Co., 631 F. Supp. 1029, 1032 (S.D.N.Y.
1986) (applying forum state's settlement bar rule). But see Harrison v. Sheats, 608
F. Supp. 502, 506-07 (E.D. Cal. 1985) (refusing to allow settlement bar in securities
claim).
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amounts affect the liability of non-settling defendants. 175 Currently, a split
in the circuits exists as to whether a "proportionate fault"' or a "pro tanto"
system of allocating liability should be used. 176 Certainly Musick has again
made it absolutely necessary for Congress or the Supreme Court to create
a uniform rule for allocating liability in these situations. 177
The Supreme Court has begun to answer the many issues raised by
Musick in Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,
N.A. 178 The Court held that no implied private right of action exists for
aiding; and abetting violations of section ,10(b) of. the 1934 Act and Rule
lOb-5.1 79 Although relying on a textual analysis, the Court reaffirmed the
framework of Musick for analyzing the elements of a Rule 10b-5 claim. 180
The Court demonstrated that precedent will not stand in the way of its
securities law analysis, ignoring "hundreds of judicial and administrative
proceedings in every circuit in the federal system" that have concluded
that aiding and abetting liability exists under section 10(b). 18 1
The Musick decision, the Central Bank decision and pressure for re-
form from strong interests groups may finally force Congress into the Rule
10b-5 arena.18 2 Several members of the United States House of Repre-
175. See Cortec Indus:, Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 839 F. Supp. 1021, 1027-30
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (post-Musick decision explaining debate over apportioning liability
in securities litigation in context of § 10(b) action); Pitt & Groskaufmanis,,supra
note 167, at 26 (explaining controversy surrounding different methods of appor-
tioning liability in securities litigation settlements and concluding that "the issue of
non-settling defendants' liability remains unresolved").
176. See Franklin v. Kaypro Corp., 884 F.2d 1222, 1230-31 (9th Cir. 1989) (en-
dorsing proportionate fault approach, allowing non-settling defendants to be lia-
ble only up to extent of culpability, regardless of previous settlement amounts),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 232 (1990). But see Singer v. Olympia Brewing Co., 878 F.2d
596, 600-01 (2d Cir. 1989) (endorsing pro tanto approach, allowing non-settling
defendants to be liable for entire amount of damages, reduced by, amounts of any
related prior settlement),. cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1024 (1990).
177. See Cortec Indus., 839 F. Supp. at 1027-30 (granting contribution to Rule
lOb-5 defendants under pro tanto apportionment method, after considering which
liability method (pro rata, proportionate fault or pro tanto) was appropriate to
apply, and remanding for extensive discovery on fairness of settlement).
178. 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994).
179. Id. at 1443-55.
180. Id. at 1448-50. The Central Bank majority primarily relied on the text of
§ 10(b) to deny aiding and abetting causes of action to private litigants, stating that
if "Congress intended to impose aiding and abetting liability, we presume it would
have used the words 'aid' and 'abet' in the statutory text. But it did not." Id. at
1448. Under' this test, no contribution would exist under § 10(b) because the
word "contribution" is not in the section. However, the Court distinguished cases
concerning the scope of conduct prohibited by § 10(b), which'requireanalysis of
the statutory text, from cases defining the elements of the Rule lOb-5 scheme,
which require an attempt to infer the intent of the 1934 Congress. Id. at 1445-48.
181. Id. at 1456 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
182. For a discussion of interest groups calling for Rule lOb-5 reform, see
supra note 15 and accompanying text. See also Brief for National Association of
Securities and Commercial Law Attorneys, Musick, Peeler & Garrett v; Employers
Ins. of Wausau, 113 S. Ct. 2085 (1993) (No. 92-34) (arguing that Musick outcome
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sentatives have sponsored a bill, the Securities Private Enforcement Re-
form Act, which would substantially reform several aspects of Rule 10b-
5.183 The United States Senate has also taken up securities reform with its
own bill, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1994.184 The Sen-
ate bill includes a provision for contribution for defendants in Rule 10b-5
actions. 185
Obviously, Congress is preparing to respond to the securities litiga-
tion crisis in some way. Hopefully, Congress will carefully examine the
implications of securities litigation reform in light of the issues raised and
addressed in the forty years of judicial reform in this area. Congress has
the rare opportunity to analyze the effectiveness of reform measures
before they are adopted by evaluating the success of reform proposals in
the jurisdictions that have already attempted them.
The United States Supreme Court took a bold step in Musick, squarely
establishing the power of the Court in defining the development of Rule
10b-5, even to the point of creating new causes of action. Eventually, the
Supreme Court will once again provoke Congress to legislate concerning
will lead to additional complexity and additional litigation which was not necessary
to fulfill the deterrent and compensatory goal of Rule lOb-5.). Some commenta-
tors, however, including Securities and Exchange Commissioner, Richard Roberts
and SEC Director of Enforcement, William McLucas, feel that Congress should
stay out of the Rule lOb-5 fray and let the courts develop the contours of the Rule.
See Securities Litigation Reform Efforts Could Harm Investors, Roberts Declares, SEC. REG.
& L. REP., July 9, 1993, at 933 (stating that "Roberts advocated 'using the judicial
system itself' to 'make the fine, qualitative judgements necessary to sift out the
meritless securities litigation from all securities litigation' rather than using rules
or statutes"); see also Adam F. Ingber, Note, lOb-5 or Not 10b-5 ?: Are the Current Efforts
to Reform Securities Litigations Misguided?, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. S351 (1993) (examin-
ing specific reform proposals and concluding Congress should abandon lOb-5 re-
form and redirect efforts towards reform of overlapping securities fraud
remedies).
183. H.R. 417, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). This Act, if passed, would amend
the 1934 Act to provide for joint and several liability only if a defendant "know-
ingly" engages in securities fraud. Id. § 20B(a)(1). Otherwise, proportionate lia-
bility would exist. Id. § 20B(a) (2). Also, attorneys' fees would be awarded to the
prevailing party in an implied private action, unless the court determined that the
position of the losing party was substantially justified. Id. § 20B(B) (1). The pro-
posed Act also has provisions for a higher burden of proof, § 20B(d), aiding and
abetting liability, § 20B(f), and a longer statute of limitations than provided for by
Lampf See id. § 36 (extending limit from three years to five years with one year
"discovery" period).
184. S. 1976, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (amending 1934 Act). In April,
1994, the bill was referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs.
185. Id. § 203 (outlining proportionate liability and joint and several liability
amendments to 1934 Act and including contribution rights for defendants in im-
plied private actions). Specifically, the bill states that "[a] person who becomes
liable for damages in an implied private action may recover for contribution from
any person who, ifjoined in the original suit, would have been liable for the same
damages." Id. § 203(G). The bill also addresses many of the issues surrounding
contribution rights that were ignored by the Musick court, such as a settlement bar
rule and a statute of limitations for contribution actions. Id. § 203(F), (H).
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Rule lOb-5,186 especially if a future Court ruling based on congressional
intent in 1934 goes against the clear congressional. intent of today. 18 7
The Rule 10b-5 judicial oak has grown strong from the legislative
acorn planted in 1934. Nevertheless, even a judicial oak, if it springs from
a weak foundation, must ultimately bow to the powerful, albeit ever-chang-
ing, winds of Congress.
Nicholas Day
186. See, e.g., Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S.
Ct. 2773, 2783 (1991) (opposing weight of authority by implying restrictive limita-
tions period on securities fraud actions, and causing uproar which culminated in
congressional limitation on decision). For a further discussion of the Lampfdeci-
sion, see supra note 4. See also Gregory P. Crinion,'Limitations Limbo: More Confusion
for Rule 10b-5 Litigants, 30 Hous. LAw. 22 (1993) (explaining controversy and con-
fusion surrounding Lampf decision and congressional response).
187. See Hassett, supra note 153, at 152, 154 (arguing that this confrontation
may take place after Central Bank decision); see also Securities Private Enforcement
Reform Act, H.R. 417, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (calling for aiding and abetting
liability in private securities litigation, and, although not yet enacted, directly con-
flicting with Central Bank).
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